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Introduction
Why do some countries have more startups intended to change the financial industry through innovative services and digitalization than others? For example, in certain economies there has been a large demand for financial technology (fintech) innovations, while other countries have made a more benevolent economic and regulatory environment available. In this paper, we investigate several economic and general technological determinants that have encouraged fintech startup formations in 64 countries. We find that countries witness more fintech startup formations when the latest technology is readily available, capital markets are well-developed, and people possess more mobile telephone subscriptions. Furthermore, we show that the available labor force has a positive impact on the fintech industry. Finally, we find that the more sound the financial system, the lower the number of fintech startups in the respective country.
Prior research on fintech mostly focuses on specific fintech sectors. In the area of crowdlending, scholars have analyzed the geography of investor behavior (Lin and Viswanathan, 2015) , the likelihood of loan defaults (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015; Iyer et al., 2016) , and investors' privacy preferences when making an investment decision (Burtch et al., 2015) . In equity crowdfunding and reward-based crowdfunding, researchers have investigated the dynamics of success and failure among crowdfunded ventures (Mollick, 2014) , the determinants of funding success (Ahlers et al., 2015; Vulkan et al., 2016) , and the regulation of equity crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2016) . More generally, Bernstein et al. (2016) investigate the determinants of early-stage investments on AngelList. They find that the average investor reacts to information about the founding team, but not startup traction or existing lead investors.
Recently, scholars have also investigated platform design principles and risk and regulatory issues related to virtual currencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum (Böhme et al., 2015; Gandal and Halaburda, 2016) . Others have analyzed social trading platforms (Doering et al., 2015) , roboadvisors (Fein, 2015) , and mobile payment and e-wallet services (Mjølsnes and Rong, 2003; Mallat et al., 2004 , Mallat, 2007 . To date, only a few studies have investigated the fintech market in its entirety. Dushnitsky et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive overview of the European crowdfunding market and conclude that legal and cultural traits affect crowdfunding platform formation. Cumming and Schwienbacher (2016) examine venture capitalist investments in fintech startups around the world. They attribute venture capital deals in the fintech sector to the differential enforcement of financial institution rules among startups versus large established financial institutions after the financial crisis.
In this paper, we investigate the formation of fintech startups more generally, rather than focusing on one particular fintech business model. In line with the classic value chain of a traditional bank, we categorize the fintech startups into four different types of startups: those that engage in financing, asset management, payment, and other business activities. The category financing entails, for example, startups that provide crowdfunding, crowdlending, and factoring solutions.
We classify fintech startups as asset management companies if they offer services such as roboadvice, social trading, or personal financial management apps or software. Furthermore, various different business models provide new and innovative payment solutions, such as mobile payment systems, e-wallets, or crypto currencies. Finally, a bulk of fintech startups offer investor education and training, innovative background services (e.g., near-field communication systems, authorization services), white-label solutions for various business models, or other technical advancements classified under other fintech startups. 5 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces our hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the data and introduce the variables used in the quantitative analysis. Section 4 presents the descriptive and multivariate results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our contribution.
Hypotheses
To derive testable hypotheses regarding the drivers of fintech startup formations, we regard fintech innovations and the resulting startups as the outcome of supply and demand for this particular type of entrepreneurship in the economy. The demand for fintech startups is the number of entrepreneurial positions that can be filled by fintech innovations in an economy (Thornton, 1999; Choi and Phan, 2006) . If the business model and services provided by the traditional financial industry, for example, are essentially obsolete, there might be a larger demand for new and innovative startups. The supply of fintech startups, in contrast, consists of the entrepreneurs who are ready to undertake self-employment (Choi and Phan, 2006) . Such a supply might be driven by a large number of investment bankers who lost their jobs after the financial crises and are now eager to use their finance skills in a related and promising financial sector.
First, we conjecture that the higher the demand for fintech startups, the more developed the traditional capital market is. This hypothesis works through two channels. As in any other startup, fintech startups need sufficient financing to develop and expand their business models. If capital markets are well-developed, entrepreneurs have better excess to the capital required to fund their business. Although small business financing traditionally does not take place through regular capital markets, fintech startups might be eligible to receive funds from incubators or accelerators established by the traditional financial sector.
1 However, such programs have mostly been established by large players located in well-developed capital markets. Moreover, Black and Gilson (1999) note that active stock markets help venture capital and, thus, entrepreneurship to prosper, because venture capitalists can exit successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings. Active stock markets might therefore have a positive effect on fintech startup formations.
In the case of firms that aim to revolutionize the financial industry, a well-developed capital market might also prompt demand for entrepreneurship simply because a larger financial market also offers greater potential to change existing business models through innovative services and digitalization. If the financial sector is small, not much can be changed through the introduction of innovative business models. Thus, for a well-developed but technically obsolescent financial sector, there are more entrepreneurial positions that can be filled by fintech innovators. We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: Fintech startup formations occur more frequently in countries with welldeveloped capital markets.
A second driver of fintech demand is the extent to which the latest technology is available in an economy so that fintech startups can build their business models on these technologies. Technical advancements are among the most important drivers of entrepreneurship (Dosi, 1982; Arend, 1999) , because technological revolutions generate opportunities that may be further developed by entrepreneurial firms (Stam and Garnsey, 2007) . Technological changes enable new practices and business models to emerge and, in the case of fintech startups, disrupt the traditional financial services sector. Such technology-driven changes have in the past occurred with the move from banking branches to ATM machines and from ATM machines to telephone and online banking (Singh and Komal, 2009 A third factor on the demand side of fintech startup formations concerns the soundness of banks.
The sudden upsurge of fintech startups can be partly attributed to the 2008 global financial crisis.
The financial crisis may have fostered the demand for fintech startups for several reasons. There is a widespread lack of trust in banks after the crisis. Guiso et al. (2013) investigate customers' trust in banks during the financial crisis and find that the lack of trust also led to strategic defaults on mortgatges, possibly initiating a vicious circle of customer distrust, defaults on morgages, even less sound banks, and again more customer distrust. Fintech startups, which largely have a clean record, might benefit from the lack of confidence in traditional banks and break the vicious circle of distrust and reduced financial soundness. In addition, the financial crisis increased the cost of debt for many small firms, and in some cases banks stopped lending money to businesses altogether, forcing them to contend with refusals on credit lines or bank loans (Schindele and Szczesny, 2016) . Fintech startups in the area of crowdlending, crowdfunding, and factoring aim to fill this gap. The demand for such startups should be particularly high in countries that have extensively suffered from the financial crises and where the banking sector is less sound. Finally, some of the fintech business models are based on exemptions from securities regulation and would not work under the somewhat more strict securities regulation that applies to large firms (Hornuf and Schweinbacher, 2016) . Stringent financial regulation was the outcome of the spread of systemic risk to the financial system (Brunnermeier et al., 2012) . Thus, economies with a more fragile banking sector and stricter regulation should see more fintech startup formations that use the existing exemptions from banking and securities laws. (Ernst & Young, 2014) . In emerging countries, mobile money has been used as a replacement to formal financial institutions, and as a result mobile money penetration now outstrips bank accounts in several emerging countries (GSMA, 2015; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016) . At the same time, new technology has enabled fintech startups in developed countries to disrupt established players and accelerate change. Technologies such as near-field communication, QR codes, and Bluetooth Low Energy are being used for retail pointof-sale and mobile wallet transactions, transit payments, and retailer loyalty schemes (Ernst & Young, 2014) . We argue that the higher the number of mobile telephone subscriptions, the higher the supply of fintech startups, as individuals who are seeking entrepreneurial activity based on these technologies have more opportunities to succeed. Fifth, on the supply side we consider the role of labor markets in fintech startup formations. In general, we assume that a rich and varied supply of labor has a positive influence on fintech startup formations. Empirical evidence supports the argument that the population size is a source of entrepreneurial supply, in the sense that countries experiencing population growth have a larger portion of entrepreneurs in their workforce than populations not experiencing growth (International Labour Organization, 1990) . To evaluate the influence of the supply of labor on fintech startup formations, we account for the size of the labor force and argue that the larger the labor market, the higher the potential number of entrepreneurs who are ready to undertake selfemployment.
Hypothesis 5: Fintech startups are more frequent in countries with a larger labor market.
Sixth, on the supply side we consider the impact of the unemployment rate on fintech startup formations. The decision to become an entrepreneur is mostly based on the income choice (Blau, 1987; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1990; Blanchflower and Meyer, 1994) .
Economies with a low unemployment rate are associated with a higher mobility between employment and self-employment because entrepreneurial failure will not be punished by unemployment later on (Choi and Phan, 2006) . 
Data and Method
Our main data source is the CrunchBase database, which contains detailed information on fintech startup formations and their financing. The database is assembled by more than 200,000 company contributors, 2,000 venture partners, and millions of web data points 2 and has recently been used in financial articles (Bernstein et al., 2016; . We retrieved the data used in our analysis on December 9, 2015. Because CrunchBase might collect some of the information with a time lag, the observation period in our sample ends on (2) shows the number of financing rounds fintech startup have obtained in that year, which almost reached 1,000 rounds in 2011 and 2012. In Column (3), we show the total amount fintech startups raised each year, which grew until 2011 and then steadily declined. Together with Column (2), this suggests that the average volume per funding round has recently dropped.
Results

Summary Statistics
Column (4) shows the number of fintech startups providing financing services, which constitute almost 54% from all categories, suggesting that the demand for innovation in financing activities was substantial. Column (5) shows statistics of fintech startups providing asset management services, which represents 9% from all categories. Column (6) shows statistics of fintech startups providing payment services, which constitute the second-largest group with 21% from all categories. Column (7) shows fintech startups providing other business activities, which constitutes 16% from all categories. For all categories in columns (4)- (7), we observe an increase in the number of fintech startups founded, with a slight decrease in the last year (2014), except for payment services, which continued to grow until the end.
To investigate different dynamics in developed and developing countries, we report descriptive statistics for the 10 most relevant European countries in terms of fintech activities, the U.S.
sample, and the total EU-27 sample. Panel B of Table I As the United States has the overall largest market share in our sample, internationally followed by the United Kingdom, Canada, India, and Germany (see Appendix Tables A3 for a Table I presents statistics for the U.S. fintech market only by year. Column (1) shows that the number of fintech startups launched in the United States, which represent almost 60% of the entire sample. Columns (4)- (7) show that fintech startups reforming financing activities constitute 57% of all fintech startups in the United States, again followed by asset management (9%), payment (19%), and other business activities (15%).
Panel D of Table I provides statistics for the EU-27 by year. Columns (1)-(7) are as described previously but calculated for the EU-27 sample only. Column (1) shows the number of fintech startups founded by year. Note that the EU-27 countries constitute only 20% of the total fintech startups we identified in our sample. The evidence shows that most financing rounds took place in the 10 most relevant EU countries, and the amounts these fintech startups raised there were also considerable, with the remaining 17 countries contributing only a tiny fraction. Fintech startups providing financing services again represent the largest share of all fintech startups in the EU-27 (50% of all fintechs), followed by payment services (23%), other business activities (18%), and asset management (9%). The importance of the fintech subcategories thus persists for all panels in Table I. Appendix Tables A3 and A4 show summary statistics and a correlation table that includes the dependent variables and the main independent variables.
--- Table I About Here --- As a robustness check, we run a standard OLS fixed effects panel model. Column (6) of Table II reports coefficients for all fintech categories. Consistent with column (1), the variable soundness of banks has a negative and statistically significant effect on the formation of fintech startups. A one-unit increase in the soundness of banks is associated with a 15.6% decrease in the formation of new fintech startups. Of note, the variable commercial bank branches has a negative effect on fintech startup formations. A one-unit increase in commercial bank branches is associated with a 0.9% decrease in the formation of new fintech startups. Finally, we find a positive effect of the variable investment profile on fintech startup formations. A one-unit increase in general investment risk is associated with a 9.0 % increase in fintech startup formations.
Country-level Determinants of Fintech Startup Formations
--- Table II About Here ---In Table III , we run the same regression excluding the U.S. fintech market, because U.S. fintechs constitute almost 60% of the total sample in our analysis. We find the results largely consistent with --- Table III About Here ---
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate economic and technological determinants that have encouraged fintech startup formations in 64 countries. We find that the United States has the largest fintech market, followed by the United Kingdom, Canada, India, and Germany at a considerable distance. Categorizing fintechs in line with the value chain of a traditional bank-financing, asset management, payment, and other business activities-we show that financing is by far the most important segment of the emerging fintech market, followed by payment, other business activities, and asset management. Financing for fintech startup formations might be important for multiple reasons, two of which could be the traditional funding gap that small firms around the globe face (Schindele and Szczesny, 2016) and funding constraints potentially due to more stringent banking regulations in the aftermath of the latest financial crisis (Campello et al., 2010; European Central Bank European Central Bank, 2013; European Banking Authority, 2015) .
While our study is exploratory in nature, it yields important insights into the evolution of fintech startups. Although the number of fintech startup formations has steadily grown, this growth and the amount these firms have raised have recently dropped. Moreover, we generally find that countries witness more fintech startup formations when capital markets are well-developed, the latest technology is readily available, and people possess more mobile telephone subscriptions, suggesting that these factors are important drivers of fintech demand. Furthermore, we show that the available labor force has a positive impact on the supply of entrepreneurs in the fintech industry, whereas the unemployment rate does not. Finally, we find that the more sound the financial system, the lower the number of fintech startups in the respective country. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the full sample, by year
Column (1) reports the number of fintech startups that started operating in a given year. Column (2) reports the number of financing rounds fintech startups have obtained in that year. Column (3) reports the overall amount raised by fintech startups in a given year in USD. Column (4) reports the number of fintech startups providing financing services. Column (5) reports the number of fintech startups providing asset management services. Column (6) reports the number of fintech startups providing payment services. Column (7) provides the number of fintech proving other business activities. The last row denoted "All Years" reports the sum across all years. The dependent variables in column (1) pertain to the number of new fintech startups founded in a given country and year. In columns (1)- (5), we report results for fintech startups providing financing, asset management, payment, and other business activities only. The data take panel structure. We report negative binomial regressions for the columns (1)- (5) because the dependent variables are count variables. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A2 . Standard errors are clustered at the country level, and the model allows dispersion to vary randomly across clusters. Columns (1)-(5) report incident rate ratios. Significance levels: ** < 5%, and *** < 1%. Column (6) reports an OLS panel fixed effect model, using as the dependent variable the natural logarithm of the number of new fintech startups founded in a given country and year.
(1) The dependent variables in column (1) pertain to the number of new fintech startups founded in a given country and year. In columns (1)- (5), we report results for fintech startups providing financing, asset management, payment, and other business activities only. The data take panel structure. We report negative binomial regressions for the columns (1)- (5) because the dependent variables are count variables. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A2 . Standard errors are clustered at the country level, and the model allows dispersion to vary randomly across clusters. Columns (1)- (5) report incident rate ratios. Significance levels: ** < 5%, and *** < 1%. Column (6) reports an OLS panel fixed effect model, using as the dependent variable the natural logarithm of the number of new fintech startups founded in a given country and year.
(1) Table A2 . List of variables
Variable Name Definition Dependent variables
Number of fintech startups founded The number of fintech startups founded in a given country and year. Source: CrunchBase.
Asset management
The number of new fintech startups providing asset management services founded in a given country and year. Source: CrunchBase.
Financing
The number of new fintech startups providing financing services founded in a given country and year. Source: CrunchBase.
Other business activities The number of new fintech startups providing other fintech services founded in a given country and year. Source: CrunchBase.
Payment
The number of new fintech startups providing payment services founded in a given country and year. Source: CrunchBase.
Explanatory variables
Cluster development Response to the survey question: "In your country, how widespread are well-developed and deep clusters" (geographic concentrations of firms, suppliers, producers of related products and services, and specialized institutions in a particular field). The variable runs from 1 = nonexistent to 7 = widespread in many fields. 
